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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to examine whether the provision of non-audit services 
by the incumbent auditor compromises auditor independence in a low litigation 
risk environment such as in the case of Spain, where the audit litigation risk is not 
likely to be the main external deterrent for audit malpractices. To achieve this goal 
we analyse whether audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined, and 
we also test whether the joint provision of audit and non-audit services reduces 
the incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports. Conﬁrming prior research, when running 
single equation models the results obtained are supportive of the presence of 
knowledge spillovers between the two services. Nevertheless, we also empirically 
establish that audit and non-audit fees are jointly determined and when applying 
a simultaneous-equation model, then, the ﬂows of knowledge spillovers cannot 
be proved. We also ﬁnd that auditors are not less likely to issue qualiﬁed audit 
reports when they jointly supply audit and non-audit services. 
Key words: ethical behaviour, auditor independence, audit fees/non-audit fees, 
knowledge spillover, qualiﬁed audit reports.
* This paper has received ﬁnancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology 
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RESUMEN
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si la independencia del auditor de una 
empresa se ve comprometida cuando presta de forma conjunta servicios de 
auditoría y servicios adicionales a la misma, en un entorno con bajo riesgo de 
litigio como es el español, donde no es probable que el auditor de cuentas se 
enfrente a algún litigio por haber llevado a cabo una mala praxis. Para alcanzar 
este objetivo, nosotros estudiamos si los honorarios de la auditoría y de los servi-
cios adicionales a la misma se determinan de forma conjunta, así como también 
si la provisión conjunta de ambos servicios reduce la incidencia de informes de 
auditoría con salvedades. Al igual que la evidencia previa, nosotros concluimos 
que cuando aplicamos un sistema de ecuaciones simples se pone de maniﬁesto 
transferencia de conocimientos entre los dos servicios. No obstante, nosotros 
también contrastamos empíricamente que los servicios de auditoría y de los ser-
vicios adicionales a la misma se determinan conjuntamente y cuando aplicamos 
un modelo de ecuaciones simultáneas, los resultados no revelan transferencia 
de conocimientos. Por otra parte, también evidenciamos que los auditores que 
prestan de forma conjunta los dos servicios no son más proclives a reducir la 
emisión de informes de auditoría con salvedades. 
Palabras clave: comportamiento ético, independencia del auditor, honorarios de 
auditoría y de servicios adicionales a la auditoría, transferencia de conocimiento, 
informes de auditoría con salvedades.
1. INTRODUCTION 
The joint provision of audit and non-audit services by the same audit ﬁrm and the fact that it 
may jeopardize the independence of the auditor when issuing the audit report has repeatedly 
been a controversial issue. 
The literature has traditionally contemplated two aspects of the audit independence: the 
mental attitude of the auditor characterized by the integrity and the objective approach to the 
audit process (named in fact independence). Some authors (Bazerman, 2007; Moizer, 1997; 
Sutton, 1997) point out that mental independence requires a freedom from personal interest, 
bias or susceptibility to excessive pressure. However, since this mental process is unobserva-
ble and auditors also have incentives to violate their independence through satisfying their 
clients so as to maintain the economic bonding to the client (Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock & 
Tanlu, 2006; DeAngelo, 1981), there is a need for the auditors to be perceived as independent 
(named independence in appearance) from the management team who prepares the ﬁnancial 
statements. In this regard, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relies on the 
apparent independence when establishing that an auditor cannot be considered independent 
with respect to a particular client “if a reasonable investor, with knowledge of all relevant facts 
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and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and 
impartial judgement” (SEC 2000, Section I). 
The joint provision of audit and non-audit services has repeatedly been considered as 
the Damocle’s sword hanging over the independence of the auditor because it can increase the 
economic bond between clients and auditors (Ashbaugh, 2004; Beattie, Goodacre & Fearnley, 
2003; De Fuentes, 2005; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). The fee dependence may inﬂuence 
the auditor to agree, against his/her better judgment, with management’s interpretations of ac-
counting matters, which is an unethical behaviour that threatens auditor independence in fact. 
Therefore, after the well known ﬁnancial scandals surrounding the beginning of this decade, 
and with the aim of restoring the apparent independence of the auditors and the reliability of 
ﬁnancial information, regulators have placed particular attention on the provision of non-audit 
services by the incumbent auditor. In the United States, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) 
banned most non-audit services, meanwhile in Europe the new Eighth Directive focused on 
the economic dependence of the auditor when stating that:
Member States shall ensure that adequate rules are in place which provide that fees for 
statutory audits are not inﬂuenced or determined by the provision of additional services 
to the audited entity (25th art. Directive 2006/43/CE).
However, highly reputed researchers have raised doubts about the adequacy of such 
normative restrictions, since the empirical evidence is far from providing homogeneous results 
and being supportive of impairment of independence fears. For instance, De Fond and Francis 
stated: “We believe that the SOX provision that bans most non-audit services is at best mis-
guided and at worst politically-motivated” (2005, p. 6).
However, archival literature reveals that ﬁnancial statements’ users perceive that the 
joint provision of both services threatens auditor independence (Bartlett, 1993; Geiger, Lowe 
& Pany, 2002; Gul, 1991; Lowe and Pany, 1995; Lowe, Geiger & Pany, 1999; Knapp, 1985; 
Shockley, 1981). Additionally, some authors document that the join provision of both services 
can cause a reduction of qualiﬁed audit reports (Wines, 1994), more earnings management 
(Frankel, Johnson & Nelson, 2002) or more errors waived, among others, reducing audit qual-
ity as well (Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006b). Thus, the regulators’ worries about how objective 
an accounting ﬁrm can be in an audit, when it is also making millions of Euros providing the 
same client with other services, make sense. 
Therefore, in our view, there is a need for further research that provides additional evi-
dence supporting or rejecting the foundations of the auditor independence rules. The aim of 
this paper is to shed some light onto this topic by addressing two questions: the ﬁrst one being 
a methodological issue, i.e. analysing if the use of simultaneous equations better estimate the 
amount of audit and non-audit fees and how the knowledge spillovers ﬂow from one service 
to another. The second research question we address is whether the provision of non-audit 
services by the incumbent auditor reduces the incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports. 
In our opinion, the Spanish setting represents a particularly useful context in which to 
analyse these research questions for several reasons. Firstly, following the international regula-
tory wave in response to the Enron debacle, the Spanish Audit Law (1988) was amended by 
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the Financial System Reform Act, 2002 (Law 44 / 22 November 2002). The new legislation 
hardened the joint provision of audit and non-audit services and required the full disclosure 
of related fees paid to the incumbent auditor by public companies, in order to supply informa-
tion to investors that can therefore estimate if the magnitude of non-audit fees impairs their 
conﬁdence in auditors’ independence. 
Secondly, the audit market structure is, as in most countries, highly dominated by the 
Big Auditing Firms. The Spanish audit market received a major boost from the mandatory audit 
requirement established by the Audit Act of 1988, but by the mid-1990s the market became 
increasingly mature and there was strong competition to win clients (García Benau, Garrido, 
Vico, Moizer & Humphrey, 1999)1. The mergers between Price Waterhouse and Coopers & 
Lybrand, and Arthur Andersen and Deloitte & Touche further increased the market share of 
the Big Four, making up to 98.66% of the total turnover of listed companies in 2003, while the 
merged ﬁrm of Deloitte España, S.L. accounted for 67% (De Fuentes, 2005). 
Although the regulatory reassurance of the auditor independence and the high concen-
tration of the audit market structure are almost worldwide characteristics of the audit service, 
the institutional, legal and corporate governance peculiarities of the Spanish setting are rather 
different from the circumstances of Anglo-Saxon countries to which most of the existing audit 
and non-audit fees literature refers to. Spanish companies are characterized by high ownership 
concentration, the major shareholders being industrial corporations and banks when referring 
to public entities, although the role of the ﬁnancial institutions is not as prevalent as in other 
countries such as Japan and Germany. Besides, the legal environment is similar to most Euro-
pean and South American countries, classiﬁed as a French-origin civil law country, with weak 
investor rights, low investor protection and low litigation risk (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). 
Summarising, although in Spain the legislative reform has paid particular attention to 
the inﬂuence of the amount of non-audit fees provided to the audit client, auditors face low 
external deterrents for independence malpractices since the audit litigation risk is low. 
Our ﬁndings show that even in a country of low audit litigation risk, where auditors 
are hardly ever sued for misconduct and negligence, they are not less likely to give a qualiﬁed 
audit report when providing audit and non-audit services. Hence, our results are supportive of 
1 The demand side of the audit service does show different growth rates in the number of audits: 
While the rate for mandatory audits is positive, basically due to the growth of companies, the demand for 
voluntary services is much more volatile, ﬂuctuating between negative growth in 1994 and 1997 and ex-
panding as high as 18% of growing rate in 1998. In more recent years, there was a steep fall in voluntary 
audit services impacting the total hours billed in 2003. This may have been a consequence of the loss of 
conﬁdence in the reliability and credibility of the ﬁnancial statements as a result of the Enron and Parmalat 
scandals in the United States and Italy, respectively. 
On the supply side, the number of audit ﬁrms in Spain increased from 645 in 1991 to 1187 in 2005, 
but throughout that period the dominance of the Big Audit Firms has been outstanding. In this regard, em-
pirical studies carried out in Spain (Carrera, Gutierrez & Carmona, 2005; García-Ayuso & Sánchez, 1999; 
García Benau, Ruiz Barbadillo & Vico Martínez, 1998) show that the market for audit services does not 
differ signiﬁcantly from neighboring countries in structure and is highly concentrated. 
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the reputational theory, where the economic losses associated to the reputational damage and 
the loss of clients are external deterrents for an auditor misapplication of the audit standards. 
The structure adopted in this paper is as follows. After this introduction, the second sec-
tion provides a review of the prior research and the hypotheses development. In the third section, 
we present the methodology and sample used in our empirical study. The fourth section presents 
and analyses the results, and the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section describes our main conclusions.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Given that the aim of this paper is to examine whether the provision of non-audit services by 
the incumbent auditor compromises auditor independence, ﬁrstly we brieﬂy analyse previous 
studies on audit and non-audit fees and their joint determination, and secondly we revise previ-
ous research on the effect that the joint provision of audit and non-audit services can have on 
the auditors’ propensity to issue qualiﬁed audit reports. 
2.1. Impairment of the auditor independence by the joint provision of audit and 
 non-audit services
Since the seminal work by Simunic (1980) three research lines have emerged. The ﬁrst consists 
of a group of studies that mainly estimate the model developed by Simunic (1980). These 
studies all deal with the likelihood that the Big Accounting Firms operate as a cartel and charge 
an audit premium to their clients (Cameran, 2005; Danos & Eichenseher, 1982; Eichenseher 
& Danos, 1981; Firth, 1985; Francis, 1984; Francis & Stokes, 1986; Low, Tan & Koh, 1990; 
Palmrose, 1986a; Simon, 1985). 
The studies of the second research line concentrate on the existence of low-balling 
(Monterrey & Sanchez-Segura, 2007; O’Keefe, Simunic & Stein, 1994; Simon & Francis, 
1988; Stein, Simunic & O’Keefe, 1994; Turpen, 1990; Walker & Castarella, 2000). In addi-
tion, these studies also aim to identify other, previously unanalysed determinants of audit fees 
(Bell, Landsman & Shackelford, 2001; Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam, 1993; Davis, Ricchiute & 
Trompeter, 1993; De Fuentes, 2005; Firth, 1997; Jubb, Houghton & Butterworth, 1996; Low 
et al., 1990; O’Keefe et al., 1994; Scott & Gist, 2005; Stein et al., 1994; Turpen, 1990).
The studies of the third research line focus on the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services. Furthermore, these studies also analyse the determinants of non-audit fees, or add 
non-audit fees as an explanatory variable for audit fees. An excellent meta-analysis of audit 
fees studies undertaken in various countries can be found in Hay et al. (2006b). Simunic (1984) 
models the joint demand for audit and non-audit services. His model suggests that the auditor 
would retain a portion of the cost savings from knowledge spillover when providing both ser-
vices to the client. Results consistent with knowledge spillover are reported by Simunic (1984), 
Simon (1985), Palmrose (1986b), Turpen (1990), Barkess and Simnett (1994), Butterworth and 
Houghton (1995), Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996), Jubb et al. (1996), Craswell and 
Francis, (1999), Bell et al. (2001), Seetharaman, Gul and Lynn (2002), Whisenant, Sankara-
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guruswamy and Raghunandan (2003), Alam and Baez-Díaz (2005), De Fuentes (2005), Antle, 
Gordon, Narayanamoorthy and Zhou (2006), and Monterrey and Sanchez-Segura (2007). In 
general terms, these studies conclude that purchasers of non-audit services pay their auditors 
higher audit fees because of knowledge ﬂowing from one service to the other. Felix, Gramling 
and Maletta (2001) ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between audit and non-audit 
fees. Conversely, Abdel-Khalik (1990), Davis et al. (1993), O’Keefe et al. (1994), Stein et al. 
(1994) and Sharma and Sidhu (2001) document no association between audit and non-audit 
fees; that is, they fail to ﬁnd evidence of knowledge spillover. 
A further step in this line of research is the analysis of the non-audit fee determinants 
(Abbot, Parker, Peters & Raghunandan, 2003; Antle et al., 2006; Barkess & Simnett, 1994; 
Defond, Raghunandan & Subramanyam, 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; ParKash & Venable, 1993; 
Raghunandan, Read & Whisenant, 2003; Sharma & Sidhu, 2001; Whisenant et al., 2003). 
Whisenant et al. (2003) use a simultaneous equation model and show empirically that 
audit fees and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined. They ﬁnd a positive relationship 
between audit fees and non-audit fees when OLS is used, but they ﬁnd no relationship when 
they use a simultaneous speciﬁcation of the fee model applying two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
In the same vein, Hay, Knechel and Li (2006a) document that in New Zealand OLS regression 
results show a positive association between audit and non-audit fees, but they ﬁnd no relation-
ship between audit and non-audit fees using a simultaneous-equation model applying 2SLS, 
suggesting that audit and non-audit services are jointly determined. 
Contrary to this evidence, Alam and Baez-Díaz (2005) ﬁnd an association between audit 
and non-audit services using a simultaneous and single equation model and they reveal that 
audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined in the banking industry in the U.S. This 
evidence is supported by Antle et al. (2006). These results are consistent with economies of scope 
(knowledge spillover) running in both directions between audit and non-audit services. 
Summarising, prior evidence about the association between audit and non-audit fees is 
mixed. Some authors conclude that non-audit services purchasers pay higher audit fees than 
non-purchasers (see, for instance, Ezzamel et al., 1996, Seetharaman et al., 2002; Simunic, 
1984). One explanation for this is that knowledge ﬂows from audit to non-audit services. On 
the other hand, O’Keefe et al. (1994) claim that the relation between audit and non-audit fees 
should be negative. In this regard, Felix et al. (2001) ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relation-
ship between audit and non-audit fees. Hence, we make no prediction about the association 
between audit and non-audit fees when jointly purchased by the client and, therefore, the null 
hypotheses we seek to test are:
H1: Non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor are not associated with audit fees paid 
to the incumbent auditor. 
H2: Audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor are not associated with non-audit fees paid 
to the incumbent auditor. 
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2.2. Impairment of auditor independence by the low incidence of  
 qualiﬁed audit reports
On the other hand, Basioudis, Papakonstantinou and Geiger (2006) reveal that companies which 
pay higher audit fees are more likely to receive a going concern opinion, while companies 
with higher non-audit fees are less likely to receive this type of opinion. Similar evidence is 
reported by Wines (1994). Concretely, he reports that companies which pay higher non-audit 
fees to the auditing ﬁrms are less likely to receive qualiﬁed audit opinions. 
On reﬂection, the previous research provides mixed evidence. However, considering 
that Spain is a context where auditors are less likely to be sued for misconduct and negligence 
(low litigation risk), we predict a negative relationship between the provision of non-audit 
services by the incumbent auditor and the auditors’ propensity to qualify audit reports, and 
the hypothesis we seek to test is:
H3: The provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor is associated with the 
low incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports.
3. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE
3.1. Methodology
To test the ﬁrst and second hypotheses we analyse whether audit and non-audit fees are si-
multaneously determined and whether economies of scope (knowledge spillover) run in both 
directions between audit and non-audit services.
As in previous research, the factors or determinants for audit and non-audit fees can 
be estimated (applying, for instance, the ordinary least squares [OLS] method) independently, 
using a single equation model for each estimation. Speciﬁcally, this procedure would consist 
of the following two fee models: 
  (1)
and
  (2)
where LNAF
i 
and LNNAF
i 
are the natural logs of audit and non-audit fees for ﬁrm
i
, 
respectively; FACTORS
i 
is a vector of determinants or factors that are supposed to inﬂuence 
audit and non-audit fees; and e
i 
and µ
i
 are the error terms. 
In equation (1), LNNAF
i
 and the error term e
i  
are likely to be correlated as the variable 
LNAF
i
 and the error term µ
i
 in equation (2). Therefore, the OLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent if the explanatory variables are distributed independently of the error term. This 
problem can be overcome through the use of simultaneous equations, so following prior authors 
(Alam & Baez-Díaz 2005, Antle et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2006a; Whisenant et al., 2003), we run 
single-equation models in order to estimate audit and non-audit fees in equations (1) and (2), 
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respectively. Next we estimate equations (1) and (2) using a simultaneous equations approach 
(two-stage least square [2SLS]). The 2SLS model cleans the explanatory variables in (1) and 
(2) of the inﬂuence of their respective error term (i.e. e
i  
and µ
i
). 
As follows, we describe audit and non-audit fee models. To this end, we discuss variables 
that are likely to affect audit and non-audit fees. 
3.1.1. Audit fees
In this section we discuss variables we expect to affect audit fees. We draw on Simunic (1980), 
Cameran (2005) and De Fuentes (2005) to identify factors that affect audit fees. Hence, the 
general model speciﬁcation for the audit fee is as follows: 
 
(3)
Where: 
LNAF =  Natural log of audit fees (in thousands of Euros)
LNNAF =  Natural log of non-audit fees (in thousands of Euros)
SIZE =  Natural log of total sales or turnover (in thousands of Euros)
BIG4 =  An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is a Big Four ﬁrm, and 0 
   otherwise. 
AUDTEN = Number of years the auditor has audited the ﬁnancial statements of the company
LOSS =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrms report negative net income in 
   the current year or in the prior two years, and 0 otherwise. 
OPINQUAL =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received a qualiﬁed opinion  
  in either the current or previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
PROFIT = Variable deﬁned as net income less extraordinary items divided by total  
  sales or turnover.
LEV = Leverage (Total Debt/Equity).
INVREC =  Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets.
SUBS =  Square root of number of subsidiaries.
SUBSFOR =  Number of foreign subsidiaries/Total number of subsidiaries.
EXT = Extraordinary items/Net income.
AC =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit committee, and  
  0 otherwise. 
DATE =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁscal year ends at 31st December, and  
  0 otherwise. 
The most consistent result in all of the previous studies has been that company size is by 
far the most signiﬁcant explanatory variable in determining audit fees. Then, the control variable 
measuring the natural log of total sales, SIZE, is intended to control for the size of the ﬁrm. It 
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is probable that audit work will increase with company size and, consequently, it is expected 
that bigger clients will pay higher audit fees than smaller clients (Whisenant et al., 2003). Thus, 
the variable SIZE is hypothesised to have a positive relationship with audit fees. 
Meanwhile, evidence shows that auditor size (Cameran, 2005; Palmrose, 1986a) is 
one of the variables that explains the level of audit fees. According to several authors (Chan 
et al., 1993; Firth, 1985; Pong and Whittington, 1994), this is because the large accounting 
ﬁrms spend a lot of time and effort on testing and analysing information and data. In addition, 
according to DeAngelo (1981), big accounting ﬁrms can charge a premium as high quality 
auditors. Thus, a positive coefﬁcient sign is expected on the BIG4 variable. Another variable 
introduced to control for auditor characteristics is auditor’s tenure, AUDTEN. According to 
Antle et al. (2006), where auditors can charge higher audit fees in the ﬁrst year of the audit 
engagement, a positive relationship can be expected between audit fees and auditor’s tenure. 
Thus, we expect a positive association between audit tenure and audit fees. 
To capture audit risk (see, for instance, Chan et al., 1993; Firth, 1985), we include a 
variable reﬂecting whether the company reported negative net income in the current year or in 
the two prior years (LOSS). We expect a positive association between negative net income and 
audit fees. Another variable in the audit fee equation to control for audit risk is whether the ﬁrms 
received a qualiﬁed audit report (OPINQUAL). Given that a qualiﬁed audit report is a measure 
of risk, we predict a positive relationship between audit fees and a qualiﬁed opinion. A further 
audit risk variable is proﬁt (PROFIT). Proﬁtability can be another measure of ﬁrm risk, and 
therefore, we expect high proﬁtability to lower risk for the auditor, because it is supposed that 
the company will be in good ﬁnancial health. To control for agency costs, we include leverage 
(LEV). A positive relationship between leverage and audit fees is expected. 
We also included variables in the audit fee equation to control for audit effort and 
complexity (see, for instance, Chan et al., 1993; O’Keefe et al. 1994). A high ratio of inven-
tory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets (INVREC) shows that the company has 
high levels of accounts receivable and inventory and, as a result, a greater audit effort will be 
required. For this reason, we predict a positive association between INVREC and audit fees. 
The complexity variables, which are expected to be positively associated with audit fees, 
are the square root of the number of subsidiaries (SUBS), the ratio of the number of foreign 
subsidiaries to the total number of subsidiaries (SUBSFOR), and the ratio of extraordinary 
items to net income (EXT). These three items may increase the complexity of the audit and, 
consequently, we expect audit fees to rise in their presence. An additional audit effort variable 
is whether the company has established an audit committee (AC)2. To the extent that an audit 
committee implies more work for auditors (monitoring and controlling managers and meeting 
with audit committee members) (see Vera-Muñoz, 2005), we expect a positive association 
between audit committees and audit fees. 
2 Apart from De Fuentes (2005), we have not found any previous work that has used the existence 
of an audit committee as a determinant of audit fees. In Spain, Audit committees became well-known when 
the Olivencia Code of Good Governance was published in 1998 (Fernández, 1999), although a few Spanish 
listed companies already had it.
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Audit work has a high seasonal component, so auditors could try to smooth their workload 
through pricing policy. Thus, emoluments for audit work performed during the period of the 
normal ﬁscal year end would be higher than audit fees charged to companies whose accounting 
period is different from the majority of ﬁrms. This factor has been tested through a dichotomy 
variable that references the normal/abnormal ﬁscal year end used, among others, by Chan et al 
(1993), Waresul and Moizer (1996) or Carson, Fargher, Simon and Taylor (2004). We expect 
a positive association between the dummy variable DATE and audit fees. 
3.1.2. Non-audit fees
For factors affecting non-audit fees, we draw on Parkash and Venable (1993), Firth (1997) 
and Whisenant et al. (2003). The vector FACTORS (equation 2) refers to variations in the 
complexity of the auditee’s operations, agency costs, the client’s and auditor’s size, audit risk, 
operating performance or proﬁtability, audit tenure and audit quality. Hence, the general model 
speciﬁcation for non-audit fees is as follow: 
 
(4)
Where: 
LIQUID =  Ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities. 
EQUITY =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company issued new shares during 
  the year or in the previous two years, and 0 otherwise. 
The remaining variables are explained above in the audit fee model. Thus, the only 
differences between the audit and non-audit fee models are the variables DATE, EQUITY and 
LIQUID. The ﬁrst was chosen as a determinant of audit fees because the literature on auditing 
pricing ﬁnds that DATE is positively associated with audit fees, whereas no empirical evidence 
exists to suggest that this variable is directly associated with non-audit fees. Consequently, we 
have not included DATE in the non-audit fee model. 
On the other hand, we include EQUITY in the non-audit fee model because previous 
research (Firth, 1997; Raghunandan et al., 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003) shows that there is a 
positive association between new ﬁnancing and non-audit fees. However, EQUITY has been 
excluded from the audit fee model because no empirical research exists to suggest that new 
ﬁnancing directly determines audit fees. The issue of securities in the stock market, an activity 
which ﬁrms engage in occasionally, is not frequent; however, this activity has important impli-
cations for the company, and if it takes place, ﬁrms prefer to hire non-audit services to receive 
advice. In addition, it will be more effective and efﬁcient if these non-audit services are hired 
from the incumbent auditor. For this reason, we also predict a positive relationship between 
the non-audit fees and EQUITY variable. 
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Furthermore, we include the Current or Liquidity ratio (LIQUID) as a measure of liquidity 
because companies with low liquidity levels may require a greater quantity of non-audit services 
or consultancy advice in order to resolve this problem (Firth, 2002). In this sense, employing 
the incumbent auditor as a consultancy adviser may increase efﬁciency and reduce costs. This 
means that the LIQUID variable has a negative relationship with non-audit fees. 
BIG4 is included as a control variable. Previous research has shown that big auditing 
ﬁrms charge a premium fee, and this suggests that the type of accounting ﬁrm can inﬂuence 
non-audit fees. Nevertheless, the expected sign is not clear. Proxy for agency cost is LEV, 
expecting a negative sign. Meanwhile, the relationship (expected coefﬁcient sign) between 
LOSS, PROFIT, OPINQUAL, INVERC, SUBS, SUBSFOR, EXT and AC and non-audit 
fees is the same as that holding between them and audit fees (i.e. it is positive or negative, as 
explained above). 
3.1.3. Qualiﬁed audit reports
We test the third hypothesis examining the relationship between various combinations of four 
auditor fees variables and the audit opinion, estimating the following logistical regression 
model:
 
(5)
Where: 
AR  = This variable takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm has received a qualiﬁed audit 
   report and 0 if it has received a clean opinion.
AUDITORFEE = In order to test the hypothesis regarding qualiﬁed audit reports, we added 
   to the model four different fee variables in various combinations. Thus, 
   AUDITORFEE is either NAF/TF (ratio of non-audit fees to total fees 
   paid to the incumbent auditor), LNAF (natural log of audit fees), LNNAF 
   (natural log of non-audit fees) or LNTF (natural log of total fees). 
LITGRISK =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm operates in a high-risk 
   industry, as identiﬁed by Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994).
AOPRIOR =  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received the same 
   qualiﬁcation in the previous and the current year; and 0 otherwise. 
The remaining variables are explained above in previous models. As indicated above, 
the auditor fees variables NAF/TF, LNAF, LNNAF and LNTF are added to the model in vari-
ous combinations. Whether the joint provision of audit and non-audit services compromises 
auditor independence, we expect a negative coefﬁcient on NAF/TF, LNTF and on its separate 
components, LNAF and LNNAF. 
Since the prior literature has shown that the propensity to issue a qualiﬁed audit report 
may be inﬂuenced by other factors, we have included several control variables that are likely 
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to affect this propensity (see Pucheta-Martínez & De Fuentes, 2007). Thus, we use company 
size, SIZE, as a proxy for auditor independence, although we do not expect any sign since 
the literature provides contradictory results (Carcello, Hermanson & Huss, 1995; McKeown, 
Mutchler & Hopwood, 1991; Mutchler, Hopwood & McKeown, 1997). For the variable audi-
tor type, BIG4, we expect a positive sign since the likelihood of receiving a qualiﬁed audit 
report is higher for companies audited by Big brand-name auditors than for ﬁrms audited by 
second-tier ﬁrms (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998; Teoh 
& Wong, 1993). On the other hand, we expect a negative association between the probability 
of receiving a qualiﬁed audit report and the auditor tenure variable, AUDTEN, since the longer 
the auditor’s tenure (and the more dependent the auditor is on the client), the more likely the 
auditor will be to yield to client pressures (Richard & Vanstraelen, 1999). 
Given that ﬁnancial health has been identiﬁed as a factor that may increase the likelihood 
of the auditor’s issuing a qualiﬁed audit report (Carcello et al., 1995; Chen & Church, 1992; 
Mutchler et al., 1997), four variables have been included to control for the ﬁnancial distress 
effect. These are leverage, LEV, as a proxy for the agency cost of debt (see Archambeault & 
DeZoort, 2001; Willekens, Bauwhede & Gaeremynch, 2004) and reported negative net income 
in the current year or in the prior two years; LOSS, since high leverage and losses may increase 
the likelihood of receiving qualiﬁed audit reports (Ruiz Barbadillo, Gómez Aguilar & Carrera 
Pena, 2006; Sánchez Segura, 1999). Moreover, we have also added PROFIT and LIQUID, 
expecting a negative sign for both variables because a company with high proﬁtability and 
liquidity is supposed to be in good ﬁnancial health and therefore, it is less likely to receive a 
qualiﬁed audit report. 
To capture the complexity of business operations that can lead to more errors and irregu-
larities and a greater likelihood of qualiﬁcation of the accounts by the auditor, we consider the 
square root of number of subsidiaries, SUBS.
Two additional variables are used to capture higher liquidity risk areas for auditor 
responsibility and for which greater caution and exercise of independent auditor judgement is 
called (Monroe & Teh, 1993). These are the ratio inventory plus accounts receivable divided 
by total assets, INVERC, larger values of which are more likely to be associated with an in-
creased propensity to qualify as well as ﬁrms that operate in a high-risk industry, as identiﬁed 
by Francis et al. (1994), LITGRISK.
Another factor requiring control is whether the qualiﬁcation is initial or recurrent, as 
this could affect the likelihood of receiving a qualiﬁed audit report in the next year. An initial 
qualiﬁcation is received when the audit report for the previous year was unqualiﬁed or contained 
a qualiﬁcation of a different category from that issued in the current year. When the same quali-
ﬁcation is expressed for two or more years running, it is deﬁned as recurrent. In this regard, it is 
likely that a ﬁrm that received a qualiﬁed audit report due, for instance, to an uncertainty with 
unquantiﬁable potential effects on the ﬁnancial statements, will receive a similar audit report 
the next year if the circumstances have not changed. Thus, we expect a positive association 
between the variable AOPRIOR and the receipt of a qualiﬁed audit report.
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3.2. Sample 
As mentioned above, the public disclosure of audit and non-audit fees became compulsory for 
public companies after the approval of the Spanish Financial System Reform Act in 2002. 
The sample for this study consists of all ﬁrms required to ﬁle their ﬁnancial statements, 
audit report and management report to the “Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores” 
(CNMV) (the supervisory body of the Spanish stock exchanges). Consequently, it includes 
all companies listed on one or more of the Spanish Securities Exchanges or issuing bonds or 
debentures. The CNMV keeps an Ofﬁcial Register, freely accessible to the public, where the 
ﬁnancial data can be consulted. 
The sample comprises 135 companies, excluding ﬁnancial services ﬁrms3 and companies 
that did not provide data for the whole set of variables, during the year 2002. Of the 135 studied, 
94 were listed on the Mercado Continuo Español (MCE-Spanish Interconnected Market), a 
computerized network connecting the country’s four exchanges (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia 
and Bilbao), during the period analysed. All the major and most liquid securities are traded 
electronically on this market. Audit and non-audit data for all the ﬁrms were obtained from 
their ﬁnancial statements. A summary of the sample used is provided in Table 1.
Table 1
Description of the sample. 
Initial sample of firms 148
Less: firms not providing data concerning one or more of the model variables, 
banking and financial industry companies and companies whose turnover was 0 
during the year 2002 13
Total firms forming the final sample 135
In Table 2 we show the distribution of the sample by industry. Table 3 reports descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the audit fees and non-audit fees models. Analysing the mean of 
audit and non-audit fees, we observe that Spanish clients tend to purchase the same amount of 
audit and non-audit services. In addition, comparing the mean values of audit fees, non-audit 
fees and total sales, we may observe that almost €1 of audit and non-audit fees are paid to the 
incumbent auditor for every €5.069 in total sales. This suggests that audit and non-audit fees 
represent approximately 0.02% of total sales for the sample.
3 Financial services companies have been excluded from the sample because, given their activity, 
this sector presents certain particularities which make it different from the non-ﬁnancial sectors. For instance, 
these ﬁrms usually provide a high ratio of leverage, which can bias the results.
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Table 2
Sample distribution by industry. 
Industry description Number Percentage
Basic metals 8 5.92 
Cement, glass and construction materials 5 3.72 
Construction 7 5.17 
Energy and water (water, gas, electricity, mining and petrol)  14 10.39 
Mass media  6 4.41 
New technology  8 5.92 
Property  26 19.25 
Retailing and other services 12 8.88 
Metal manufacturing 8 5.92 
Transportation and communication 9 6.67 
Other manufacturing industries (food, drinks, tobacco, textiles and printing) 28 20.75 
Other  4 2.97 
Total  135 100
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for variables. 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
   Deviation 
AUDITFEES (e thousands) 72.04 109.225 1 800
NONAUDITFEES (e thousands) 73.11 249.57 0 2.253
TOTALFEES (e thousands) 145.16 320.00 1 2.632
SIZE (e thousands) 365.011 1.060.377 84  9.348.387
AUDTEN 4.55 1.90 1 6
LIQUID 2.88 6.25 0.05 52.05
PROFIT 0.86 2.47 -0.82 16.46
LEV 0.47 .22 0.01 1.07
INVEREC .26 .23 0 0.84
SUBS 3.34 2.44 0 12.88
SUBSFOR .22 .26 0 1
EXT -.24 1.37 -7.19 4.03
Panel B: Dichotomous variables
Variable N  Proportion of dummy = 1 (%)
BIG4 135   79%
DT 135   38%
PWC 135   19%
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Table 3 (Continued)
Descriptive statistics for variables. 
Variable N  Proportion of dummy = 1 (%)
EY 135  10%
KPMG 135  13%
OAF* 135  21%
LOSS 135  14%
OPINQUAL 135  15%
AC 135  22%
DATE 135  96%
EQUITY 135  21%
LITGRISK 135  32%
AUDITFEES = Audit fees (in thousands of euros)
NONAUDITFEES = Non-Audit fees (in thousands of euros)
TOTAL FEES = The sum of audit and non-audit fees. 
SIZE = Total sales or turnover (in thousands of euros)
AUDTEN =Number of years the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company
LIQUID = Ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities. 
PROFIT = Variable defined as net income less extraordinary items divided by total sales or turnover
LEV =Leverage (Total Debt/Equity)
INVREC = Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets
SUBS = Square root of number of subsidiaries
SUBSFOR = Number of foreign subsidiaries/Total number of subsidiaries
EXT = Extraordinary items/Net income
BIG4 = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. 
DT = Deloitte & Touche
PWC = PriceWaterhouseCoopers
EY = Ernst & Young
KPMG
OAF =Other audit firms or Second tier firms
LOSS = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms reports negative net income in the current year or in the 
two years prior, and 0 otherwise. 
OPINQUAL = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received a qualified opinion in either the current 
or previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
AC = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
DATE = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year ends at 31st December, and 0 otherwise. 
EQUITY = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company issued new shares during the year or in the two years 
prior, and 0 otherwise. 
LITGRISK = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a high-risk industry, as identified by Francis 
et al. (1994)
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.1. Audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting ﬁrms by industry
Table 4 shows audit and non-audit fees paid to accounting ﬁrms by industry. As we can observed, 
companies in retailing and other services, basic metals, transportation and communication and 
metals manufacturing sectors pay more than 85% of total fees for audit services. Companies 
in cement, glass and construction materials or in construction sectors pay almost 73% and 
60%, respectively, of their total fees for audit services. On the other hand, property and other 
manufacturing industries (Food, drinks, tobacco, textiles and printing) pay approximately 50% 
of total fees for audit and the remaining 50% for non-audit services. Finally, audit ﬁrms receive 
more than 60% of their total fees from non-audit services provided to the energy and water, mass 
media and new technology sectors. We can observe that there is a great disparity in the volume 
of additional services provided to different industrial sectors: Meanwhile non-audit services 
emoluments of retailing companies only account for up to 2% of the total fees, new technology 
companies pay a bill of additional services that represents 68% of the total amount. 
4.2. Hausman test for endogeneity 
Before estimating equations (3) and (4) simultaneously, we identify whether there is simulta-
neity, that is, if the regressors in equations (3) and (4) are endogenous and, therefore, likely to 
be correlated with their respective error terms. Then, as explained above, we need to use an 
alternative procedure such as the two stage least squares (2SLS)4 method (Gujarati, 1995).
We use the Hausman test for this purpose, which includes the residuals of each endoge-
nous right-hand side variable, as a function of all exogenous variables, in a regression of the 
original model. This involves running each of the equations (3) and (4) in two-steps. In the 
ﬁrst step, an estimate of the endogenous variables is obtained by regressing on exogenous 
variables. The coefﬁcients are estimated in the second step using the residuals from the ﬁrst 
stage as an added variable. If the coefﬁcient of the residuals is different from zero, then the 
simultaneity has caused a bias. 
In our statistical analysis, both coefﬁcients are different from zero and statistically signiﬁ-
cant so the evidence supports the presence of endogeneity in both directions. Thus, we estimate 
a system of two simultaneous equations in order to jointly determine audit and non-audit fees. 
4 Two-stage least-squares regression uses instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the er-
ror terms to compute estimated values of the problematic predictor(s) (the ﬁrst stage), and then uses those 
computed values to estimate a linear regression model of the dependent variable (the second stage). Since 
the computed values are based on variables that are uncorrelated with the errors, the results of the two-stage 
model are optimal.
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Table 4
Audit fees and Non-Audit fees paid to Accounting ﬁrms by industry.
Industry description Number
Audit Fees
Mean (in 
thousands of 
euros)  (%)
Non-Audit Fees
Mean (in thou-
sands of euros) 
(%)
Total Fees
Mean (in thou-
sands of euros)
Basic metals 8
54.25
(96.88)
1.75
(3.13)
56
(100)
Cement, glass and construction 
materials
5
70.20
(72.37)
26.80
(27.63)
97
(100)
Construction 7
88.86
(60.04)
59.14
(39.96)
148
(100)
Energy and water (water, gas, electric-
ity, mining and petrol) 
14
183.98
(35.67)
331.78
(64.33)
515.76
(100)
Mass media 6
68.83
(38.17)
111.50
(61.83)
180.33
(100)
New technology 8
107.25
(31.78)
230.25
(68.22)
337.50
(100)
Property 26
28.83
(55.70)
22.93
(44.30)
51.76
(100)
Retailing and other services 12
106.33
(98.08)
2.08
(1.92)
108.41
(100)
Metal manufacturing 8
63.37
(85.06)
11.13
(14.94)
74.50
(100)
Transportation and communication 9
22.00
(92.94)
1.67
(7.06)
23.67
(100)
Other manufacturing industries (food, 
drinks, tobacco, textiles and printing)
28
59.71
(54.10)
50.64
(45.90)
110.35
(100)
Other 4
17.50
(87.50)
2.5
(12.50)
20
(100)
4.3. Audit fees
In Table 5 we present the results of estimating the audit fees equation using a single equation 
model (OLS estimate) and a simultaneous-equation model. Using the single-equation speciﬁca-
tion, the F-statistic is signiﬁcant at 1% and adjusted R2 is 81%. The intercept is signiﬁcant at 
5% and shows a negative relationship with audit fees. Consistent with prior evidence, we ﬁnd 
a signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcient for the non-audit fee variable (LNNAF). This suggests 
that non-audit services purchasers pay higher audit fees than non-purchasers. 
On the other hand, SIZE, BIG4, PROFIT and SUBS are statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, 
showing a positive association with audit fees. This suggests that big companies audited by 
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a big auditing ﬁrm with high levels of proﬁt and subsidiaries pay more audit fees than small 
ﬁrms audited by a second-tier ﬁrm with low levels of proﬁt and no subsidiaries. The remaining 
variables are not statistically signiﬁcant. 
All the signiﬁcant variables offer the expected sign, except the coefﬁcient on proﬁt, 
which shows a positive direction, opposite to the predicted sign but similar to prior ﬁndings 
(Carson et al., 2004; Waresul Karim & Moizer, 1996). 
Next, we examine whether the ﬁndings obtained from single-equation estimation of 
audit fees leads to incorrect inferences because of simultaneous-equation bias. Table 5 also 
offers the 2SLS estimates based on equations (3) and (4). We ﬁnd that the LNNAF variable is 
not statistically signiﬁcant and therefore does not directly inﬂuence audit fees after controlling 
for the joint determination of the fees. The audit fee model explains 56.22% of the variation 
in audit fees. We ﬁnd that only the SUBS variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant so, 
consistent with Whisenant et al. (2003), the complexity of operations inﬂuences the determi-
nation of audit fees. 
Table 5
Result for the determinants that affect AUDIT FEES (N=135 companies).
OLS estimate 
(Single-Equation Specification)
2SLS estimate
(Simultaneous-Equation Specification)
Variables
Expected 
sign
Parameters 
estimated
t statistic
Parameters 
estimated
t statistic
Intercept +/- -1.200 -3.230** 7.387 0.846
Independent variables
LNNAF +/- 0.054 2.127** 1.942 1.011
Control variables
SIZE + 0.339 10.098*** -0.631 -0.643
BIG 4 + 0.567 4.358*** -0.793 -0.567
AUDTEN + 0.018 0.733 -0.041 -0.538
LOSS + 0.113 0.814 -0.971 -0.868
OPINQUAL + 0.077 0.556 0.750 1.026
PROFIT - 0.120 5.241*** -0.204 -0.621
LEV + -0.201 -0.795 -1.028 -1.029
INVREC + 0.072 0.305 3.774 0.994
SUBS + 0.107 4.431*** 0.177 2.250**
SUBSFOR + 0.060 0.300 -0.776 -0.860
EXT + 0.023 0.654 0.727 1.011
AC + 0.084 0.686 -0.365 -0.698
DATE + 0.094 0.413 0.160 0.389
Statistics
Adjusted or pseudo R2
81.03% 56.22%
F-statistic
(probability value) 
42.713
(0.000***)
12.20
(0.000***)
***Significant at the level of 1%.
**Significant at the level of 5%.
*Significant at the level of 10%
CONSEJO LATINOAMERICANO DE ESCUELAS DE ADMINISTRACIÓN, CLADEA 81
DE FUENTES Y PUCHETA-MARTÍNEZ
Table 5 (continued)
Result for the determinants that affect AUDIT FEES (N=135 companies).
LNNAF = Natural log of non-audit fees (in thousands of euros).
SIZE = Total sales or turnover (in thousands of euros).
BIG4 = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. 
AUDTEN =Number of years the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company.
LOSS = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms reports negative net income in the current year or in the 
two years prior, and 0 otherwise. 
OPINQUAL = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received a qualified opinion in either the current 
or previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
PROFIT = Variable defined as net income less extraordinary items divided by total sales or turnover.
LEV =Leverage (Total Debt/Equity).
INVREC = Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets.
SUBS = Square root of number of subsidiaries.
SUBSFOR = Number of foreign subsidiaries/Total number of subsidiaries.
EXT = Extraordinary items/Net income.
AC = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
DATE = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year ends at 31st December, and 0 otherwise. 
4.4. Non-audit fees
In Table 6 we report the results for the determinants of non-audit fees using a single equation 
model (OLS estimate). We ﬁnd that the model is signiﬁcant at 1% and adjusted R2 is 35.30 %. 
LNAF is positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. The intercept is signiﬁcant at 1% and shows a nega-
tive relationship with non-audit fees. On the other hand, the SIZE, INVREC, SUBS, EXT 
and EQUITY variables are also statistically signiﬁcant at 1% or 5%, with SIZE and EQUITY 
showing a positive association with non-audit fees, while INVREC, SUBS and EXT display 
a negative association. This suggests that big companies which issued new shares during 
the year or in the two years prior will pay higher non-audit fees than smaller ﬁrms, whereas 
companies with a high ratio of INVREC (Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total 
assets), a high ratio of EXT (extraordinary items/net income) and with subsidiaries will pay 
lower non-audit fees. We ﬁnd that the remaining variables are not statistically signiﬁcant and 
do not inﬂuence non-audit fees. 
We also report in Table 6 the results for the simultaneous-equation speciﬁcation of 
the non-audit pricing model. The LNAF variable is not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests 
that audit fees are not a determinant of non-audit fees after controlling for simultaneous bias. 
Thus, it seems that simultaneous bias is the reason for the reported association between audit 
and non-audit fees in the non-audit fees model. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the model is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and adjusted or pseudo R2 is 34.50%. Only the INVREC, EXT and EQUITY 
variables are statistically signiﬁcant. While INVREC and EXT exhibit a negative association 
with non-audit fees, EQUITY shows a positive relationship. 
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Table 6
Result for the determinants that affect Non-AUDIT FEES (N=135 companies).
OLS estimate 
(Single-Equation Specification)
2SLS estimate
(Simultaneous-Equation Specification)
Variables
Expected 
sign
Parameters 
estimated
t statistic
Parameters 
estimated
t statistic
Intercept +/- -4.338 -3.903*** -2.353 -0.625
LNAF +/- 0.599 1.912* 1.931 0.706
Control variables
SIZE + 0.346 2.213** -0.173 -0.176
BIG 4 +/- 0.193 0.397 -0.686 -0.396
AUDTEN + 0.020 0.233 0.003 0.029
LOSS + 0.559 1.183 0.316 0.541
LIQUID - 0.014 0.451 0.008 0.282
OPINQUAL + -0.361 -0.755 -0.450 -0.889
PROFIT - 0.122 1.387 -0.064 -0.182
LEV - 0.610 0.679 1.020 1.038
INVREC + -1.753 -2.227** -1.684 -2.079**
SUBS + -0.177 -1.996** -0.288 -0.900
SUBSFOR + 0.553 0.810 0.343 0.479
EXT + -0.357 -2.906*** -0.369 -2.968***
AC + 0.190 0.444 0.148 0.279
EQUITY + 0.888 2.216** 1.083 2.663***
Statistics
Adjusted or pseudo R2 35.30% 34.50%
F-statistic
(probability value) 
5.866
(0.000***)
5.670
(0.000***)
***Significant at the level of 1%.
**Significant at the level of 5%.
*Significant at the level of 10%
LNAF = Natural log of audit fees (in thousands of euros).
SIZE = Total sales or turnover (in thousands of euros).
BIG4 = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. 
AUDTEN =Number of years the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company.
LOSS = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms reports negative net income in the current year or in the 
two years prior, and 0 otherwise. 
LIQUID = Ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities. 
OPINQUAL = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received a qualified opinion in either the current 
or previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
PROFIT = Variable defined as net income less extraordinary items divided by total sales or turnover.
LEV = Leverage (Total Debt/Equity).
INVREC = Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets.
SUBS = Square root of number of subsidiaries.
SUBSFOR = Number of foreign subsidiaries/Total number of subsidiaries.
EXT = Extraordinary items/Net income.
AC = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has an audit committee, and 0 otherwise. 
EQUITY = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company issued new shares during the year or in the two years 
prior, and 0 otherwise. 
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4.5. Qualiﬁed audit reports
In Table 7 we report the results of estimating the logistic regression in equation (5), introducing 
various combinations of the fee variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 4, with Model 2 testing whether 
total fees reduce the propensity to issue qualiﬁed audit reports and Model 4 simultaneously ana-
lysing the effect of non-audit and total fees on the low incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports. 
Table 7
Result for the factors that affect Qualiﬁed audit reports (N=135 companies).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables Expected sign
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Intercept +/-
-3.096
(0.280)
-3.104
(0.283)
-2.977
(0.309)
-2.827
(0.343)
NAF/TF -
-1.408
(0.352)
-1.686
(0.420)
LNTF -
-0.280
(0.595)
0.144
(0.847)
LNAF -
0.410
(0.599)
LNNAF -
-0.122
(0.534)
Control variables
SIZE +/-
-0.302
(0.274)
-0.230
(0.483)
-0.347
(0.337)
-0.420
(0.253)
BIG 4 +
1.415
(0.249)
1.371
(0.275)
1.362
(0.281)
1.148
(0.366)
AUDTEN -
0.134
(0.539)
0.162
(0.470)
0.124
(0.581)
0.112
(0.621)
LOSS +
1.560*
(0.082)
1.493*
(0.094)
1.542*
(0.087)
1.451
(0.101)
LEV +
1.289
(0.584)
1.053
(0.646)
1.278
(0.587)
1.036
(0.652)
PROFIT -
-1.382*
(0.091)
-1.344*
(0.098)
-1.409*
(0.086)
-1.448*
(0.071)
LIQUID -
0.006
(0.958)
-0.005
(0.964)
0.008
(0.945)
0.006
(0.960)
SUBS +
-0.302
(0.448)
0.183
(0.345)
0.129
(0.538)
0.112
(0.597)
INVERC +
2.677
(0.138)
2.802
(0.116)
2.691
(0.139)
2.845
(0.123)
LITRISK +
0.141
(0.851)
0.132
(0.863)
0.155
(0.838)
0.175
(0.816)
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Table 7 (Continued)
Result for the factors that affect Qualiﬁed audit reports (N=135 companies).
Variables Expected sign
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
Parameters 
estimated
(p-value)
APRIOR +
4.351***
(0.000)
4.365***
(0.000)
4.329***
(0.000)
4.260***
(0.000)
Statistics 
Adjusted or pseudo R2 60.10% 59.60% 60,10% 59.80%
%Classification 92% 92.6% 92,6% 92.60%
χ2 56,368 55,732 56.405 56.012
(Sig. .000) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***) (0.000***)
***Significant at the level of 1%.
**Significant at the level of 5%.
*Significant at the level of 10%.
NAF/TF = Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to the incumbent auditor
LNTF = Natural log of total fees (audit plus non-audit fees) (in thousands of euros)
LNAF = Natural log of audit fees (in thousands of euros)
LNNAF = Natural log of non-audit fees (in thousands of euros)
SIZE = Total sales or turnover (in thousands of euros)
BIG4 = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is a Big Four firm, and 0 otherwise. 
AUDTEN =Number of years the auditor has audited the financial statements of the company
LOSS = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firms reports negative net income in the current year or in the 
two years prior, and 0 otherwise. 
LEV = Leverage (Total Debt/Equity)
PROFIT = Variable defined as net income less extraordinary items divided by total sales or turnover
LIQUID = Ratio of current assets divided by current liabilities. 
SUBS = Square root of number of subsidiaries
INVREC = Inventory plus accounts receivable divided by total assets
LITGRISK = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm operates in a high-risk industry, as identified by Francis 
et al. (1994)
AOPRIOR = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the company received the same qualification in the previous and 
the current year; and 0 otherwise.
Four models introduce the following combinations of the fee variable: NAF/TF alone, 
LNTF alone, both NAF/TF and LNTF, and both LNAF and LNNAF, respectively. The ﬁndings 
in the four models show that the estimated coefﬁcients are statistically insigniﬁcant in every 
case. The hypothesis that the provision of non-audit services reduces the propensity to issue 
qualiﬁed audit reports cannot be supported since in Models 1 and 3 the variable NAF/TF is 
insigniﬁcant and in Model 4 the insigniﬁcant variable is LNNAF. The analysis of Models 2 
and 4 also show that total fees do not cause a low incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports since 
there is a lack of signiﬁcance on LNTF in Models 2 and 3 and on both LNAF and LNNAF 
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in Model 4. The lack of signiﬁcance on the fee variables in Model 4, which simultaneously 
deals with the impact of non-audit fees and total fees, reveals that auditor fees do not threaten 
auditor independence. 
The ﬁt of the four models ranges from 59.60% to 60.10%, while the level of correct 
classiﬁcation (i.e. the percentage of correct predictions) ranges from 92% to 92.60%. The χ2 
test conﬁrms that the four models are signiﬁcant. 
In order to test for the presence of multi-colinearity, we have calculated the Spearman 
correlation coefﬁcients for all the independent and control variables. The results, which are not 
reported in order not to enlarge the paper, show that none of the correlations between pairs is so 
high (> .85) as to present signiﬁcant multi-colinearity problems (see Archambeault & DeZoort, 
2001). Further analyses such as the VIF test, the condition index and variance proportions were 
also carried out without giving rise to signiﬁcant problems5. 
5. SENSITIVITY TESTS
In this section we analyse the robustness of the results regarding the joint determination of 
audit and non-audit fees. To this end, we split the sample into sub-samples, based on various 
characteristics that could cause differential knowledge spillovers that are not obvious in the 
full sample. 
5.1. Partitioning the sample by auditor size
After splitting the sample into Big4 ﬁrms and Non-Big4 ﬁrms, we estimate both the single-equa-
tion and the simultaneous-equation models of the audit and non-audit fees models. We aim to 
analyse whether the audit and non-audit fees models are independent for sub-samples with 
Big4 and Non-Big4 auditors. If we focus on the sub-sample of Big4 auditing ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that 
non-audit fees are determinants of audit fees using OLS (coefﬁcient = .053; sig. .047) but not 
using 2SLS (coefﬁcient = -1.327; sig. .383), and that audit fees are not determinants of non-audit 
fees using OLS (coefﬁcient = .656; sig. .102) and 2SLS (coefﬁcient = -4.024; sig. .396). Once 
again the results are affected by simultaneous-equation bias. For the Non-Big4 sub-sample, 
we ﬁnd that non-audit fees are not determinants of audit fees (coefﬁcient = -.012; sig. .933) 
and audit fees are not determinants of non-audit fees (coefﬁcient = .172; sig. .607) using OLS. 
5 We also examined the variance inﬂation factors (VIF’s), and none was so high as to indicate 
multi-colinearity problems (see Neter et al, 1985), since all values are below 10, which is generally used 
as a critical threshold according to Haan (2002). We also considered the condition index and variance pro-
portions, and no evidence of serious multi-colinearity arose in the regressions. Hair, Aderson, Tatham and 
Black (1995) point out that the threshold value for the condition index is usually in the range of 15 to 30. A 
multi-colinearity problem is indicated where a condition index accounts for more than 0.90 of the variance 
of two or more coefﬁcients (not the constant). We did not ﬁnd any dimension that had values at this level. 
We also examined the standard errors of the parameter estimates as identiﬁed in the logistic regression model 
for all the hypothesized variables. These were smaller than the parameter estimates. Consequently, we may 
conclude that multi-colinearity does not pose a signiﬁcant problem for these regressions. 
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Furthermore, the results are not affected by simultaneous-equation bias because, after estimat-
ing both models using 2SLS, the coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. Our ﬁnding is not 
robust for the sub-sample with Big4 accounting ﬁrms, estimating a single-equation non-audit 
fees model in which audit fees is an explanatory variable (without splitting the sample), or 
Non-Big4 accounting ﬁrms, estimating a single-equation audit (non-audit) fees model in which 
non-audit (audit) fees is an explanatory variable (without splitting the sample). These results 
suggest that fee model speciﬁcation is sensitive to auditor size. Speciﬁcally, sensitivity is likely 
to be more important in samples with Non-Big4 auditing ﬁrms.
5.2. Partitioning the sample by client size
In order to analyse whether our sample is sensitive to client size, we partition the sample using 
the median value of total sales into large (total sales above median) and small companies 
(total sales below median). We estimate audit and non-audit pricing models using OSL and 
2SLS for the samples with large and small companies. For the large companies sample, we 
document that non-audit fees are signiﬁcant and positive in the audit fees model employing 
the OLS estimation, but not statistically signiﬁcant using 2SLS. We also ﬁnd that audit fees 
are signiﬁcant in the non-audit fee model using the OLS estimation, but not using 2SLS. This 
suggests that simultaneous-equation bias is the cause of the association between non-audit fees 
and audit fees in the auditing pricing model and between audit fees and non-audit fees in the 
non-auditing pricing model. For the small companies sub-sample the results are not consistent 
with those obtained for the large companies sub-sample. Using OLS and 2SLS estimation, 
none of the coefﬁcients is statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, we may conclude that simultaneous-
equation bias does not cause different inferences in the small companies sub-sample. In line 
with prior research (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995), in this study fee model speciﬁcation 
is also sensitive to client size. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This research investigates the threat to auditor independence (unethical behaviour) caused by 
the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent auditor. Two settings are used to address 
this topic. The ﬁrst studies whether audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously determined. 
The second studies whether the joint provision of audit and non-audit services affects auditors’ 
propensity to issue qualiﬁed audit reports. 
Consistent with prior research (Alam & Baez-Díaz, 2005; Antle et al., 2006; Hay et al., 
2006a; Monterrey & Sanchez-Segura, 2007; Whisenant et al., 2003;), we show that audit and 
non-audit fees are positively associated in both audit and non-audit fees models by estimating 
a single-equation audit (non-audit) fees model in which non-audit (audit) fees is an explanatory 
variable. This suggests that knowledge spillovers occur from one service to the other. 
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However, the Hausman test shows that audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously 
determined. We then explicitly consider the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit 
fees. The results are not consistent with non-audit fees directly inﬂuencing audit fees or audit 
fees directly inﬂuencing non-audit fees. In conclusion, we ﬁnd no association between audit 
and non-audit fees using a simultaneous speciﬁcation of the fees system. These results are 
not consistent with knowledge spillovers from the joint performance of audit and non-audit 
services after controlling for the joint behaviour of audit and non-audit fees. Hence, knowledge 
spillovers from non-audit to audit services, as well as from audit to non-audit services, differ 
depending whether single or simultaneous equation speciﬁcations are used, suggesting that 
single-equation speciﬁcations of either audit or non-audit fees suffer from simultaneous-equa-
tion bias or a statistical misspeciﬁcation. 
On the other hand, the ﬁndings also reveal that the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services as well as total fees do not reduce the incidence of qualiﬁed audit reports. We have 
reached this evidence after using various combinations of fee variables. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that although in Spain auditors do not face a high litigation risk, 
they seem to show an independent behaviour even when providing audit and non-audit services. 
These results can also be considered as supportive of the reputational theory, since auditors’ 
reputation concerns and the fears of losing the clients may also inﬂuence their behaviour. 
The results of the study are subject to possible limitations. Firstly, the study only examines 
the impairment of Spanish auditor independence during one year, and the results may therefore 
not be transportable over different time periods and locations. In addition, some particular 
Spanish characteristics such as the low litigation risk for auditors or the high level of owner-
ship in listed companies, among others, can explain why these results cannot be extended to 
other settings. This limitation also provides additional opportunities for investigating this topic 
in different countries; in particular, there is a need to have deeper insight into different legal 
and institutional environments. Secondly, our results reveal that knowledge spillovers from 
non-audit to audit services, as well as from audit to non-audit services, appear differently using 
single and simultaneous equation speciﬁcations. In addition, we also evidence that auditors 
are not less likely to issue qualiﬁed audit reports when they jointly supply audit and non-audit 
services. However, these results document association, not causation. 
Despite these limitations, from a policy perspective, and taking into account the hot 
debate over the supply of certain types of non-audit services to the audit clients, the data suggest 
that the fears of some legislators about the impairment of auditor independence whether both 
services are jointly provided (see, for instance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; Eight EC Directive or 
LAC, 1988) may not be justiﬁed. Thus, it would be interesting to observe if regulators proceed 
with caution before placing further limitations on auditors’ services. 
From a research perspective, the ﬁndings of this study should motivate further inquiry into 
whether the joint provision of audit and non-audit services may provide beneﬁts to the company, 
given that the criticisms against the joint supply of both services are less supported.
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